To assess the consequences of advance medical directives --which explicitly specify a patient's preferences for one or more specific types of medical treatment in the event of a loss of competence n we analyze the medical care of elderly Medicare beneficiaries who died between 1985-1995. We compare the care of patients from states that adopted laws enhancing incentives for compliance with advance directives and laws requiring the appointment of a health care surrogate in the absence of an advance directive to the care of patients from states that did not. We report three key findings.
Introduction
The consequences of advance medical directives -which explicitly specify a patient's preferences for one or more specific types of medical treatment in the event of a loss of competence, generally at the end of life (EOL) -have been extensively debated by physicians, philosophers, and social scientists. On one hand, proponents of advance directives argue that they address two important social problems. First, since substantial health care resources are consumed at the EOL, advance directives that specify preferences to forgo treatment have the potential to reduce health care costs. In 1990, the 6.6% of Medicare recipients who died accounted for 22% of program expenditures, a pattern that has changed little over time (Lubitz and Riley 1993) .
Second, patient autonomy and well-being may also be enhanced by the use of advance directives. Although society has reached a consensus that treatment decisions should reflect patients' informed preferences (e.g., Teno et al. 1994 ), this ideal is often not implemented in practice. Because patients for whom advance directives are relevant are incapacitated and because the common-law right of patients to refuse treatment is unclear (Redleaf et al. 1979) , physicians traditionally have made such treatment decisions in consultation with the incapacitated patient's family members. But because physicians' and patient-surrogates' perceptions of patients' preferences are often inaccurate (Teno et al. 1995; Layde et al. 1995; Hare et al. 1992) , substituted judgment in this context may result in medical treatment decisions that do not reflect patients' wishes. This is especially important because treatment at the EOL may be of questionable value. For example, Altman (2001) reports that many cancer patients receive chemotherapy at the EOL, even if their type of cancer is known to be unresponsive to the drugs.
On the other hand, a substantial body of work has found that advance directives do not deal effectively with these issues. Advance directives may be infrequently used by patients (Menikoff et al. 1992) , and, when they are, not consistently followed by physicians (Covinsky et al. 2000) . People may believe that their wishes will be carried out even in the absence of an advance directive. Physicians may believe that advance directives are medically unethical, if the preference of patients who are near death differ from those patients' preferences at the time they executed their advance directive (Byrne and Thompson 2000) .
Yet, virtually all existing research focuses on the effect on an individual's care of his or her adoption of an advance directive, despite the fact that the enforceability of and the incentives for compliance with advance directives are largely determined by statutes that differ from state to state. In this paper, we explore how these state laws affect care at the EOL. We analyze the medical treatment received by a 20 percent random sample of elderly Medicare beneficiaries who died between [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] . We compare the care of patients who died in states that adopted laws enhancing incentives for compliance with advance directives and laws requiring the appointment of a health care surrogate in the absence of an advance directive to the care of patients in states that did not. To investigate whether these laws affect patients differently depending on their cause of death or their educational attainment, we stratify our sample of Medicare beneficiaries by matching it with information from the US National Center for Health Statistics Public Use Multiple Cause of Death file. This paper proceeds in five sections. Section I discusses previous investigations of the effects of advance directives. Although this research shows how advance directives affect treatment given a system of law, it does not investigate how the laws that specify the incentives for compliance with advance directives affect EOL care. Section I concludes that differences in states' legal environments may explain some of the differences in findings in the existing literature. Section I also concludes that another body of law may affect treatment at the EOL: state health care surrogate laws, which impose default rules on surrogates' decision-making even in the absence of an advance directive. Section II presents our empirical models of how legal, market, and other factors determine EOL care. Section III describes our data in detail. Section IV presents our results, and Section V concludes.
I.
The Effects of Advance Directives on Care at the EOL Advance directives provide a formal, legal mechanism for a competent person to specify her preferences for medical treatment in case she becomes unable to make decisions. Federal and state law govern the extent to which advance directives constrain the decision-making processes of doctors and hospitals. In 1991, Congress adopted the Patient Self Determination Act, which requires that institutions inform patients that they can execute a formal advance directive (Teno et al. 1994) . States have passed two types of laws governing treatment of the incapacitated. The first type of law specifies the conditions under which doctors and hospitals must follow advance directives and the punishment (if any) that they bear from failing to do so.
The second type of law specifies how treatment decisions are made for incompetent patients in the absence of an advance directive.
The existing literature paints an equivocal picture of the consequences of advance directives. One arm of the literature uses surveys of physicians and patients to assess the effects of advance directives. Although early work reports that both doctors and patients believe advance directives affect patient care (e.g., Klutch 1978 , Redleaf et al. 1979 , subsequent survey research questions this conclusion. In an analysis of interviews with 126 nursing home residents and their families, Danis et al. (1991) found that care was consistent with patients' previously expressed wishes 75 percent of the time; however, the presence of a written advance directive did not improve the consistency of care with patients' wishes. Based on a comparison of patients' actual advance directives to their detailed survey responses, Schneiderman et al. (1992b) suggest that this lack of efficacy may be due to the failure of instructions in standardform advance directives to adequately communicate patient wishes to physicians.
A second arm uses observational data to compare the treatment decisions, health care
expenditures, and health outcomes of severely ill patients who expressed a preference to forgo treatment to those of patients who did not. Studies using this method employ regression analysis to adjust for differences in health and socioeconomic characteristics across patients, calculating the effect of expressed patient preferences on treatments and outcomes, holding other factors constant. These studies also come to conflicting conclusions, with some work finding that expressed patient preferences in some forms can reduce treatment intensity (Teno et al. 1995) and hospital charges (Chambers et al. 1994 , Weeks et al. 1994 , and other work finding that advance directives have no impact on either treatments or outcomes, over and above the effect of more-informally-expressed patient preferences (Teno et al. 1994 ).
However, because observational data on health status is notoriously incomplete, unobserved differences across patients may lead the estimated effects of advance directives to either overstate or understate the true impact of patient preferences. A third set of studies seeks to eliminate this potential bias through the use of randomized controlled trials (RCTs), in which patients randomized to a "treatment" group are offered the opportunity to execute an advance directive and patients randomized to the "control" group are not. Based on an RCT, Schneiderman et al. (1992a) (Teno et al. 1997 ) reduced the use of intensive medical services near the end of life.
In contrast, also using an RCT, Molloy et al. (2000) report that a comprehensive program to educate health care providers, patients, and family members about advance directives reduced health services utilization without affecting satisfaction or mortality.
Although RCTs estimate treatment effects without the bias to which nonexperimental studies are prone, they may not provide accurate guidance about the effects of feasible legal reforms on actual medical practice. For two reasons, RCTs that offer patients the opportunity to execute a directive could show no effect, even if laws governing advance directives affect medical practice. First, the RCT might have been conducted in a state with weak or nonexistent incentives for compliance. Second, laws enhancing incentives for compliance with advance directives may increase doctors propensity to respect the preferences of patients both with and without advance directives. Furthermore, there are no RCTs examining how other related laws, such as those governing health care surrogates' treatment decisions, interact with the use of advance directives to affect EOL care.
The failure of the literature to investigate how state laws affect EOL care is striking, since existing studies suggest that the incentives provided by laws are an important determinant of the effectiveness of advance directives. RCTs from states (such as California) that provide strong incentives compliance with patients' wishes observe that patients' preferences about intensive resuscitation measures were routinely elicited in detail before they lost decisionmaking capacity, regardless of whether the patient had actually executed an advance directive (Schneiderman et al. (1992a) ). By comparison, North Carolina has a weaker living will law, and Danis et al. (1991) found that care was consistent with patients' previously expressed wishes in only 75 percent of cases.
II. Empirical Models
Our modeling strategy and data are similar to those used in Kessler and McClellan (2002) . We model the effects of law changes as differences in time trends across states in the medical care of elderly Medicare decedents during the eleven-year period 1985-1995. We measure five medical care outcomes for patients at the EOL: the location of death (in or out of acute care hospital), whether the patient had an acute care hospital stay in the month before death, whether the patient had a nonacute care (mainly skilled nursing) stay in the month before death, the natural logarithm of acute care hospital expenditures in the last month of life conditional on having an acute care stay, and the natural logarithm of nonacute care expenditures in the last month of life conditional on having a nonacute care stay. We specify these outcomes as nonparametric functions of patient demographic characteristics; state-level legal, political, and health-care market characteristics; and state-and time-fixed-effects.
While this strategy fundamentally involves differences-in-differences (DD) between reforming and nonreforming states to identify effects, we modify conventional DD estimation strategies in several ways. First, as noted above, our models include few restrictive parametric or distributional assumptions about functional forms. Second, we allow law reforms to have dynamic effects on treatment decisions. We separately estimate the effect of law reforms for individuals who died shortly after the adoption of an advance directive law versus long after adoption of a relevant law.
We use a panel-data framework with observations on successive cohorts of decedents. In state s = 1...S during year t = 1...T, our observational units consist of individuals I=1...N st who died. Each patient has observable characteristics X ist , including race, gender, and age, which we describe as a fully-interacted set of binary variables, as well as many unobservable characteristics that also influence their course of medical treatment. The individual receives treatment of R ist in the month before death, where R denotes one of the five measures discussed above.
We define state laws affecting advance directives and health care surrogacy in effect at the time of each individual's death with four categorical variables. We classify each state as having adopted or not adopted one of two types of laws: laws enhancing physicians' and hospitals' incentives for compliance with advance directives, and laws requiring delegation of treatment decision-making in the absence of an advance directive. Some laws enhancing incentives for compliance simply state that advance treatment directives of an approved form are legally binding; others specify civil and/or criminal penalties for physician disregard of a valid
(1) advance directive; others specify conditions under which a physician can refuse to comply with an advance directive; others provide a liability waiver for actions arising out of good-faith compliance with an advance directive. Laws requiring delegation of treatment decisions to a health care surrogate in the absence of an advance directive generally specify the conditions under which and the individuals from whom a physician or hospital must seek guidance for treatment of a dying patient. Table 1 specifies which states require delegation of treatment decisions (by the end of our study period, all states had adopted laws providing incentives for compliance with advance directives) and when each state adopted each type of law.
To distinguish long-term from short-term effects of law reforms, we estimate dynamic models that separate the effect of reforms soon after and long after their adoption. We define L 1st =1 if state s adopted a law enhancing incentives for compliance with advance directives between 1986 and 1995, but no more than two years before the patient's year t death (i.e., in year 1 W includes the contemporaneous and one-year-lagged political party of each state's governor, the majority political party of each house of each state's legislature, and contemporaneous and one-year-lagged interaction effects between these two variables. We also examine the effect of law reforms separately for certain subgroups of patients that reforms are likely to affect differently. First, we estimate the effect of laws separately for patients dying from cancer, because the risk of fatality and lack of acuity associated with many cancers mean that EOL care decisions are explicitly considered by such patients (e.g., Steinhauser et al. 2000) . Second, we examine the differential impact of laws by patients' level of educational attainment. More educated patients may be more likely to have the resources that enable them to affect their EOL care. But even if they do, laws may have greater or lesser effects for more educated patients, depending on the effectiveness of laws as a substitute for or complement to patients' private efforts. Models that interact laws with patients' education are of the form:
where E ist is a vector of two variables denoting the proportion of individuals in patient i's demographic cell who graduated from high school or who had missing educational attainment (omitted group includes patients with less than high school education; see description below of how E ist is constructed). In these models, we also allow the different baseline time trends 2 t for states adopting reforms in 1985 or earlier to vary by patients' educational attainment.
III. Data
The data used in our study come from three principal sources. likely to die in an acute care hospital, for decedents from states adopting such laws 3 or more years before their death. Laws requiring delegation also lead to increases in both the probability of an acute care hospital stay at any time in the last month of life and to increases in the magnitude of acute care expenditures, conditional on a hospital stay. In contrast, laws requiring delegation led to substantially less frequent nonacute stays --in the long run, 1.76 percentage points fewer. Given that 25 percent of all decedents had a nonacute stay in the last year of life in 1995 (table 2), this effect is substantial. Table 3 shows that laws governing treatment at the EOL --both those enhancing incentives for compliance with advance directives and those requiring delegation of treatment decision-making in the absence of an advance directive --take time to reach their full effect. In general, the effect of such laws is larger and more precisely estimated for laws in place at least 3 years prior to the individual's death. for the entire population of decedents --a 1.38 percentage point reduction in the probability of dying in an acute care hospital as compared to a .76 percentage point reduction (table 3) . The long-run effect of such laws on the probability of receiving nonacute care for cancer decedents is almost twice as large as well --a 1.65 percentage point increase as compared to a .83 percentage point increase. However, the long-run effect of laws requiring delegation on the probability of dying in an acute care hospital is smaller in magnitude for cancer decedents, and statistically insignificant. Table 5 presents estimates of equation (2), and shows that the effect of laws governing care at the EOL differ by decedents' level of educational attainment. On one hand, the effects of laws enhancing compliance with advance directives are greater for less educated patients.
IV. Results
Patients with less than a high-school education from states adopting laws enhancing incentives are 1.88 percentage points less likely to die in an acute care hospital; this effect is half as large (= -1.88 + .93) and statistically insignificant for patients with a high school education or greater.
On the other hand, the effects of laws requiring delegation of treatment decision-making in the absence of an advance directive are greater for more educated patients. Patients with a highschool education or greater from states adopting laws requiring delegation are .73 percentage points statistically significantly more likely to die in an acute care hospital than are their counterparts with less than a high-school education; the negative effect of laws requiring delegation on the probability of a nonacute stay in the last month of life is statistically significantly larger for more educated patients as well.
V. Conclusion
Can public policy play a constructive role in the management of health care at the EOL?
At least in theory, state law specifies the process by which physicians and hospitals consider the input of patients (through patients' written advance directives) and their families or guardians (in the absence of an applicable advance directive) in treatment decision-making. Proponents of laws enhancing providers' incentives for compliance with patients' advance directives argue that the formal processes established by such laws improve patient autonomy and save money by reducing unwanted, unproductive EOL treatments. However, in practice, substantial clinical evidence suggests that laws may not be the only, or even the most important, determinant of care in this context. Important concerns over inappropriate limitation of care for dying patients further contributes to the theoretical ambiguity of the welfare consequences of laws guiding EOL
care.
Yet, surprisingly little work has sought to evaluate the effects of such laws on patients'
care. In this paper, we assess empirically the consequences of two types of laws -laws enhancing incentives for compliance with advance directives, and laws requiring the appointment of a health care surrogate -on care at the EOL. Based on an analysis of Medicare claims data, matched with Social Security death records, we estimate the effect of variation across states and over time in these laws on the location of patients' death and the care received at the EOL. To investigate whether such laws have different effects on different types of patients, we match information on cause of death and educational attainment from the National Center for Health Statistics Public Use Multiple Cause of Death for ICD-9 file.
We find that the laws that we study have a significant influence on patients' EOL care.
First, laws enhancing incentives for compliance significantly reduce the probability of dying in an acute care hospital. However, they do not lead to any net savings in medical expenditures.
Although laws lead to a reduction in expenditures through a reduction in the probability of an acute care hospital stay, they also lead to a more-than-offsetting increase in expenditures conditional on an acute care stay. On net, such laws lead to a net average increase in total hospital expenditures in the last month of life of $335, or about 2.4 percent of the 1995 average of $14,122. Laws requiring delegation of treatment decisions in the absence of an advance directive significantly increase the probability of an acute care hospital stay and significantly decrease the probability of a nonacute care hospital stay in the last month of life. Laws requiring delegation also have a positive effect on average expenditures in the last month of life, of $379
per decedent.
Second, we find that laws enhancing incentives for compliance lead to almost twice as large of a reduction in the probability of dying in an acute care hospital for patients dying from cancer, consistent the laws having a larger causal effect for patients for whom EOL care decisions are particularly important. In addition, we find the expenditure-increasing effect of the laws is smaller for cancer decedents than for the average decedent, largely because the laws have approximately half as large an effect on the volume of acute care hospital services that cancer decedents receive.
Third, we find that the effect of laws governing EOL treatment differ depending on a patient's educational attainment. The effects of laws enhancing compliance with advance directives are greater for less educated patients, but the effects of laws requiring delegation of treatment decision-making in the absence of an advance directive are greater for more educated patients.
These changes in patterns of care are consistent with some of the previous clinical literature on the effects of advance directives. Advance directives are not simply a device for the refusal of treatment. Although surveys find that treatment refusals are the most common preference expressed in an advance directive, they are not the only one: indeed, for some illnesses, surveyed patients' preferences were almost evenly split between a directive to supply and a directive to withhold intensive treatment (Emanuel 1991) . Clinical studies have also suggested that surrogates systematically opt for more intensive treatment than patients prefer. Layde et al. (1995) 
